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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses dynamic ticket pricing by Major League Baseball and how it applies to the 
measurement or transaction explanation of pricing.  Key reductions in the cost of measuring 
margins that vary in value, such as the win/loss record of the opposing team, are identified, and 
these reductions in measurement cost help explain the switch from static to variable to dynamic 
pricing of tickets. Instructors of intermediate microeconomics and managerial economics that 
wish to discuss dynamic pricing may find this example interesting to sports oriented students. 
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Introduction 
 Several decades ago, Major League Baseball (MLB) teams set prices for their stadium 
seats at the beginning of the season and did not adjust these prices as the season progressed.  In 
the last decade, some teams have adopted dynamic pricing for some of their tickets.  This system 
has been used for years in the airlines and hotel industries and on websites such as eBay and 
Amazon.com (Bitran and Mondschein, 1995; Kines, 2010; Demmert, 1973).  With dynamic 
pricing, the price of tickets is adjusted on a daily or hourly basis, right up to the time of a game, 
in accordance with changing patterns of demand.  By responding to market fluctuations, dynamic 
pricing allows firms to adjust prices to correspond with buyers’ changing willingness to pay. 
 The airline industry is often characterized as a success story in dynamic pricing.  Indeed, 
it utilizes this technique so skillfully that most of the passengers on any given plane have paid 
different ticket prices for the same flight.  With the advent of improving information 
technologies and forecasting software, dynamic ticket pricing spread to the sports business in 
2008 when the San Francisco Giants became the first Major League Baseball (MLB) team to use 
this technique in the pricing of single-game tickets.   Moreover, dynamic ticket pricing is now 
being used across Major League Soccer, the National Basketball Association, the National 
Hockey League, NASCAR, and college football.  The purpose of this paper is to analyze and 
describe the introduction of dynamic pricing to MLB. 
 While undergraduate textbooks in intermediate microeconomics and managerial 
economics include extensive discussions on pricing strategies, they do not generally discuss 
dynamic pricing.  For example in intermediate microeconomics, neither Pindyck & Rubinfeld 
nor Goolsbee, Levitt & Syverson discuss which margins to price, nor how frequently to change 
prices.  In managerial textbooks, McGuigan, Moyers & Harris do mention dynamic pricing, but 
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only in a complicated business to business internet sales context.  Boyes mentions peak load 
pricing in an example related to electricity markets, but does not describe the circumstances 
under which it becomes optimal to change prices. 
 Since the adoption of dynamic pricing by MLB, several papers have been published 
dealing with this topic (Drayer, Shapiro, and Lee, 2012; Kobritz and Palmer, 2011).     As with 
this paper, the advantages and disadvantages of dynamic pricing are addressed in the context of 
the professional sports industry (Kyle and Sibdari, 2009).  What this paper contributes is an 
explanation of change; if dynamic pricing works so well, why was it adopted decades ago in the 
airline and hotel industries yet not introduced to MLB until 2008?  Drayer et al suggest rising 
costs created a “need” for more revenue.   This paper claims that MLB teams have always 
“needed” revenue, and that what has changed is the cost of measuring and pricing different 
factors that change the value of a particular ticket, such as the win/loss record of the opposing 
team. Measurement cost theory helps explain the introduction of dynamic pricing to MLB. 
 
A Primer on Measurement Costs 
 Measurement or transaction cost theory was developed in the 1980s (Barzel, 1982, 1989) 
to address limitations of the perfect information assumption of Neoclassical economics.  Starting 
with most of the assumptions of Neoclassical theory, including many maximizing buyers and 
sellers, rising marginal costs, and diminishing marginal value, measurement cost theory added 
the assumption of positive transaction costs.  These are real costs associated with buyers and 
sellers protecting property rights when engaging in economic transactions.  Below is an example 
to make these abstract concepts clear. 
 Suppose the product is fresh tomatoes, and start with all of the Neoclassical assumptions 
including homogeneous goods.  Each tomato is identical to any other tomato, and the market 
price acts to equate the supply of tomatoes with the demand for tomatoes.  The price may be in 
either dollars per tomato, or dollars per pound of tomato.  These units of measurement are 
interchangeable and irrelevant, for each tomato is identical, so a pound of tomatoes always 
contains the same number of tomatoes.  This is the theory that is taught as supply and demand in 
introductory economics courses. 
 But now drop the assumption of homogeneous tomatoes; let them vary by size.  Add a 
cost for both counting and weighing tomatoes, with the cost of weighing greater than the cost of 
counting.  Suppose initially sellers choose to market their tomatoes with a price per tomato in 
order to economize on the cost of weighing.  What will happen? 
 If tomatoes are priced on a per unit basis, yet the units vary in size, maximizing 
consumers will compete to acquire the larger tomatoes; they will spend resources sorting to find 
the larger tomatoes.  Each consumer will evaluate tomatoes until the expected value of finding 
another large tomato has decreased to the cost of searching for one more tomato – the standard 
marginal condition of utility maximization.   The cost of sorting is a transaction costs, which may 
be defined as the costs buyers and sellers incur to ensure that they are receiving the maximum 
value from a transaction (Barzel, 1989).   
 When a margin of value such as the size of the tomato is not priced, and buyers compete 
for the more valuable items by spending resources (in this case sorting), the un-priced value is 
considered Common Property or Left in the Public Domain. While each consumer may be 
maximizing, competition by means of sorting does not maximize the aggregate value of all 
tomato transactions.  This is because the same smaller tomato is repeatedly evaluated (and 
rejected) by consumers.  The cost of sorting the same small tomato again and again is a 
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deadweight loss – no one receives it.  The aggregate value of tomato sales would be higher if 
tomatoes were only sorted once. 
 The cost of excess sorting is born by both buyers and sellers.  Since consumers anticipate 
incurring sorting (transaction) costs when purchasing tomatoes, their willingness to pay is 
reduced by this expected costs.  This results in deadweight loss analogous to the deadweight loss 
of a tax, and in the same way as a tax, the loss in value is divided between buyers and sellers. 
Sellers may decide to reduce multiple sorting costs (and therefore increase consumers’ 
willingness to pay) by performing the sorting themselves.  Perhaps they sort tomatoes into two 
categories, large and small, and price each accordingly.  This reduces the value to customers 
from sorting the tomatoes, and since there is less to be gained by sorting within the presorted 
category, consumers will do less of it.  Sorting by consumers could be eliminated entirely if 
sellers perform sorting to a fine enough scale – not two categories, but a continuum of categories.  
Of course this is the same as weighing each tomato. 
 What drove the sorting equilibrium was the assumption that weighing is more expensive 
than counting.  However, technological changes have reduced the cost of weighing tomatoes. 
The inclusion of automatic scales integrated into the cash register have eliminated the role of a 
separate produce clerk.  Sellers responded to this reduction in the cost of weighing by switching 
pricing from dollars per tomato to dollars per pound.  This eliminated the benefit from customers 
sorting tomatoes for size, and therefore reduced the transaction costs  of buying and selling 
tomatoes.  Sellers captured some of this lower cost by charging a higher price based on 
consumers greater willingness to pay. 
 This example may be summarized as follows.  Goods have many attributes or margins 
that vary in value.  Consumers spend resources trying to find units that are of the maximum 
value net of the price paid.  These resources are one form of transaction costs, and they may be 
reduced by selecting a pricing mechanism that applies a price per unit of value to the margins 
with the greatest variability in value.  Measurement cost theory predicts that maximizing sellers 
will select the pricing mechanism that creates the greatest value net of transaction costs. This 
general result will be extended and applied to the introduction of dynamic pricing to MLB. 
 
Margins of Value in Baseball Pricing 
 The item sold at a MLB event, a ticket to a seat, has many margins that vary in value.  
The seat may be located close to or far from the field.  All locations near the field are not of the 
same value.  If the particular location is to be priced separately from other locations, the seller 
must determine which seats command a higher price.  The seller must also enforce seat 
assignments, or buyers may move from low cost seats to unsold high cost seats. 
 There are many other sources that contribute to the variability of the value of a seat.  
Factors that will cause this variation include how far in advance the ticket is purchased, the 
win/loss record of the team as the season progresses, the opposition team, the win/loss record of 
the opposing team as the season progresses, the weather forecast, and other entertainment events 
scheduled on the same date.  Each of these factors may change the value of a seat, and each may 
have a differential impact on the change in value of different seats.  For example, a competing 
event such as a rock concert may reduce the value of bleacher seats more than seats near the 
field. 
 In the absence of measuring costs, teams would price each of these margins correctly, 
resulting in no greater consumer surplus for one seat or game than any other seat or game.  Since 
seats would not vary in value net of price, consumers would not spend any time competing for 
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seats.  There would never, for example, be lines for tickets or the need to make advanced 
purchases (Barzel, 1974).  Of course the margins described are expensive to measure, so teams 
leave some unmeasured and un-priced, resulting in search costs on the part of consumers.  It 
should be noted that this conclusion assumes that consumers’ utility functions are identical.  
However, individual consumers might value these characteristics differently and thus different 
seats might provide different levels of consumer surplus.  Thus, there would still be transactions 
costs. 
 In the example of tomatoes described in section two, the transaction costs were excessive 
search costs.  Competition for items of above average value reduced the net gains from 
transacting.  In the case of MLB these costs took the form of purchasing tickets too far in 
advance, and waiting too long in line for same day purchases (Barzel, 1974).  Another pricing 
complication, and deadweight loss from mispricing, occurs from the capacity constraints of 
stadiums, which is the topic of section four.  
 
Pricing With Capacity Constraints 
An important element in the technology of some industries, such as MLB and airline flights, is 
capacity constraints (Feng and Xiao, 2001; Oren, 1985).  In order to illustrate how these 
constraints impact pricing, we begin with an example of a parking lot.  The lot has 80 spaces, 
and there are other parking lots nearby, but not on the same block.  Some customers prefer this 
parking lot, but they are willing to select a different lot if there are not any spaces available or if 
the price is too high.  Given imperfect substitutes, the monopoly model helps clarify pricing 
decisions to maximize profit (Badinelli, 2000). 
 
  
Figures 1A and 1B.  In 1A the profit maximizing price of $5 and quantity of 50 is not affected by the 
capacity constraint of 80.  In 1B Marginal Revenue is positive at the capacity constraint of 80.  
Additional sales would increase revenue if the constraint were not binding. 
 
 Figure 1A illustrates the case where the demand for parking is relatively low, and it does 
not make sense to fill the lot every day.  The marginal cost of servicing another customer is zero 
up to the point where all the spaces are in use.  Beyond that point it is not possible to add another 
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customer, so the marginal cost curve becomes vertical at 80 spaces.  The parking lot owner's 
total profit is maximized where the marginal revenue obtained from renting parking spaces 
equals the marginal cost of providing them (which in this case is zero), at 50 parking spaces.  To 
rent 50 spaces, the parking lot operator sets a price of $5 per space.  Note that the capacity 
constraint of 80 spaces does not influence the price or quantity – 30 spaces are normally left 
empty.  And since marginal cost is zero, profit maximization is equivalent to revenue 
maximization (Dana, 1999). 
 Contrast this low demand situation with the relatively high demand situation of Figure 
1B.  In this figure, profit maximization again occurs where the marginal revenue curve intersects 
the marginal cost curve--that is, at 80 parking spaces.  But in this case, marginal revenue is above 
zero at this output.  While the parking lot operator could increase revenue by renting more than 
80 spaces, this is not possible since there are only 80 spaces to rent.  The best choice for the 
parking lot operator is to fill the lot by charging a price of $6 per space.   
 The previous example addressed monopoly pricing in a world where demand is known 
with certainty, but price discrimination is not possible.  The focus of this analysis is the change 
in pricing that occurs when measurement of willingness to pay is expensive, and therefore 
demand is not known with certainty.  What is the effect of misestimating demand and therefore 
overpricing or underpricing a product (Borland and MacDonald, 2003)? 
 Figure 2A illustrates the effect of parking-space overpricing.  Suppose the parking lot 
operator believes demand is high, and sets a price of $6, when demand is in fact low, so that the 
optimal price is $5.  At the $6 price, only 40 customers will rent spaces instead of the 50 
customers that would rent spaces if the price was $5.  This reduction in quantity (the "quantity 
effect") leads to a $50 loss in revenue--10 parking spaces times $5, or $50.  But the 40 customers 
who do rent parking spaces pay a price of $6 instead of $5, resulting in $40 of additional revenue 
(the "price effect").  Therefore, the overpricing of parking spaces causes a net loss of revenue to 
the operator equal to $10 -- $40 in gain and $50 in loss. 
 Figure 2B illustrates the effects of parking-space underpricing.  Suppose the parking lot 
operator believes demand is low, and sets a price of $5, while in fact demand is high, so that the 
optimal price is $6.  This mis-estimation reduces the operator's revenue by $80--the $1 lower 
price times the 80 units rented.  There are also 20 additional customers who would like to rent a 
space at $5, but are unable to do so (McAfee and Velde, 2004) .  There does not exist any 
offsetting quantity effect.  The lot operator must put out a “lot full” sign. 
 Comparing Figures 2A and 2B, the revenue losses from “overpricing” ($10) are smaller 
than the revenue losses from “underpricing” ($80).  One way to think about this is to compare 
revenue changes for small pricing errors both when the capacity constraint is not binding 
(Figures 1A and 2A) and when it is binding (Figures 1B and 2B).  In Figure 2A, at the point of 
profit maximization, the quantity effect of another sale (the dark gray area) is offset by the price 
effect (the light gray area) of lowering the price to make the additional sale.  Since these two 
effects offset each other at the point of maximization, small errors in pricing yield very small 
changes in profitability whether the price is too high or too low.   
 In the case of Figure 2B, underpricing results in a negative pricing effect (the light gray 
area), but there is no offsetting positive quantity effect (the dark gray area) --because the parking 
lot is full.  If the error had been too high a price in 2B, there would exist a quantity effect, for 
sales would have been reduced.  But the price effect would have (partially) offset the quantity 
effect, resulting in only a small change in revenue and profits.  Given a binding capacity 
constraint, the effects of overpricing and underpricing are therefore not symmetric.  Losses are  
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Figures 2A and 2B.  In 2A the dark gray area represents the Quantity Effect – the change in 
revenue from additional sales.  The light grey area represents the Price Effect – the additional 
revenue from a higher price.  In 2B  the dark gray Quantity Effect – the additional revenue from 
additional sales at a lower price – does not exist because of the capacity constraint.  Therefore 
the net change in revenue from a lower price is composed only of the negative price effect 
without an offsetting positive quantity effect. 
 
greater from underpricing, and firms will therefore err on the side of overpricing and leaving 
empty parking spaces (or baseball stadium seats). 
 Combining these ideas leads to the conclusion that it is generally better to overprice, and 
make the capacity constraint non-binding.  If in fact demand is lower than anticipated, the price 
effect somewhat offsets the quantity effect whether or not the capacity constraint was anticipated 
to be binding.  But if demand is higher than anticipated, if the constraint was binding, there is not 
an offsetting quantity effect. 
 
The Historical Development of Baseball Pricing – Static and Variable Pricing 
 MLB baseball pricing reflects technology with fixed capacity constraints as described in 
section four, and variation in willingness to pay based on seat location and the ever changing 
demand determinants described in section three.  The history of ticket pricing in MLB can be 
divided into two parts—static pricing and dynamic pricing.  Section five describes how static 
pricing evolved into what may be called variable pricing.  Section seven describes the 
introduction of dynamic pricing. 
 Traditionally, baseball teams charged a single price for a particular seat for all home 
games played throughout the season.  Such prices were set months before the season began.   
With this pricing scheme, only one margin was priced – the location of the seat – leaving all 
other variability in value in the public domain.  In microeconomics terms, this pricing system can 
be viewed as being akin to “menu cost,” the cost to a firm resulting from changing its prices.  
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Menu costs include updating computer systems, hiring consultants to develop new pricing 
strategies, as well as the literal costs of printing price quotations (menus) and communicating 
new prices to customers.  Because of this expense, firms sometimes do not always change their 
prices with every change in supply and demand, leading to price rigidity.  In the past, repricing 
an entire baseball stadium was an arduous, time consuming, and expensive endeavor, thus 
contributing to a team's desire to maintain a static pricing policy.  However, recent 
improvements in computer technologies and the fact that most tickets are now sold electronically 
appear to have detracted from the menu cost argument.  
 Why did firm using static pricing only price one margin of value, the location of the seat?   
Drayer, Shapiro and Lee suggest that teams did not price other margins of value because of low 
organizational costs such as low player salaries, and the switch to pricing these margins resulted 
from increases in organizational costs.  But this explanation is inconsistent with profit 
maximization.  From the perspective of which margins to price, team salaries are a fixed cost, 
and a standard result of profit maximization is that fixed costs do not determine the extent (how 
much) of any activity. 
 The explanation of this paper is that the variability in value of these margins was lower 
than the cost of measuring and pricing them.  The profit maximizing MLB teams left these 
margins in the public domain because any gains in revenue from pricing them were less than the 
cost of pricing them.  For example, during some seasons the Red Sox may find games against the 
Yankees might command a premium over games against other teams.  But if the costs of 
determining this premium for thousands of different seats exceeded the additional revenue from 
creating these special prices and tickets, the Red Sox would elect to choose not to create special 
prices for Yankee games.  This attribute of value would be left in the public domain, and fans 
would gain access to it by standing in line for tickets against the Yankees.   
 What made the location of the seat worth pricing, while all other attributes were un-
priced?  Variations in seat location – nearer or farther from the field – is a margin that does not 
change over time, since of course the seats do not move.  And since it only has to be measured 
once, it is a relatively low cost margin to price.  In an era of non-computerized printing of 
tickets, determining different prices for seat location and creating tickets with different prices 
was an expensive process.  By using static pricing, that cost only had to be incurred once, at the 
beginning of the season. 
 MLB ticket pricing therefore included variations in price for only one inexpensive –to-
measure variation in value – seat location.  It did not account for changing demand conditions 
that were known at the beginning of the season, such as the identity of the opposing team, or 
demand conditions unknown at the beginning of the season, such as the win/loss record of the 
opposing team or the weather forecast (Rascher, D., McEvoy, C., Nagel, M., and Brown, M., 
2007).  Given the expense of measuring the variation in value from both sources of variability, 
and the cost of re-pricing thousands of tickets manually, it is not surprising teams found it more 
efficient to set prices at the beginning of the season. 
 By the early 2000s, static ticket pricing evolved into a variable pricing system for many 
teams, in which tickets for some games were priced higher than tickets for other games.  This 
was still a form of static pricing, for prices were set at the beginning of the season, and would not 
change in reaction to changing determinants of demand.  Teams charged higher ticket prices for 
those games that were perceived to be more alluring (or more valuable) to fans and thus entailed 
stronger fan demand.  For example, during 2008-2011, the Seattle Mariners priced about half of 
their games on a variable basis.  When the highly popular Boston Red Sox or the San Francisco 
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Giants came to Seattle, tickets included a premium charge of $5 in addition to the regular price; 
if these teams came to town on a summer weekend, the premium charge was increased to $7 per 
ticket.  The Mariners found that by charging higher prices when demand was anticipated to be 
more inelastic and lower prices when demand is more elastic, the team's total revenue increased 
compared to the total revenue that was generated by pricing tickets at a fixed price for all games 
played throughout the season.   Yet under this variable pricing system, ticket prices for prime 
games, weekend games, and value games were locked in for the entire season; they were static 
and thus did not change as the season evolved. 
 Varying ticket prices in this way occurred because the cost of measuring and pricing 
these margins - all based on the schedule at the beginning of the season – decreased.  How did 
the cost of measuring these margins change? The most obvious change was the development of 
computerized information systems.  These systems automatically recorded whether or not a 
given seat was sold, and the price and date at which it sold.  These computer information systems 
were adopted by increasing numbers of US businesses throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  Not 
surprisingly, measurement and pricing of additional margins followed.   The automated 
recording of prices reduced the cost of measuring past sales at different prices.  And automated 
systems dramatically reduced the cost of applying premiums to some tickets and not others.  In 
2012, the Seattle Mariners followed the lead of other teams and switched to a dynamic ticket 
pricing strategy. 
 
The Development of a Secondary Market: StubHub 
 Prior to the development of the Internet, the resale or secondary market for tickets was 
dominated by individuals selling tickets on the date of the game in face-to-face transactions with 
purchasers.  Sellers would be a combination of fans wanting to sell unwanted tickets (such as 
season ticket holders) and professional “scalpers” engaging in arbitrage.  MLB made concerted 
efforts to suppress the secondary market; however this became increasingly difficult with the 
development of online markets such as EBay (Courty, 2003).   
 Eventually MLB, in cooperation with eBay, formed StubHub, an online secondary 
market for tickets. Teams get a commission from StubHub as well as the ability to keep tabs on 
what fans are paying for their product on the open market.  StubHub takes a 25 percent 
commission after the sale occurs (10 percent from the buyer, 15 percent from the seller). Sellers 
range from season ticket holders to holders of single-game tickets who want to sell tickets that 
would otherwise go unused.  Because of the large number of buyers and sellers, no individual 
has pricing power, which leads to a competitive market for resold tickets.  In this market ticket 
prices change constantly – dynamic pricing in the extreme.   
 StubHub was important in the development of dynamic pricing.  It developed a market, 
with clearly posted prices, in which prices changed in response to changing demand conditions.  
While “scalpers” have historically provided a secondary market, in informal secondary markets 
price information is expensive to acquire.  How does a potential buyer standing outside a stadium 
know if the price the seller requests is competitive?  StubHub reduced the cost of price 
information, facilitating trade.  Since the market was approved and owned by MLB, buyers 
became more confident that the product they received – tickets – would be honored by teams.  
 Simply put, StubHub has turned the sometimes murky world of ticket reselling into an 
open and transparent process.  Fans can easily purchase and sell tickets online without lurking 
outside a stadium prior to a game, warily looking around to make sure authorities don’t see the 
financial transaction.  However, StubHub has become so popular that fans often shop at the 
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online reseller for tickets before checking with a baseball team’s box office.  That leaves teams 
with an unsold inventory of tickets.  Therefore, dynamic pricing has come to be viewed as a way 
that teams could fight back to capture ticket sales lost to StubHub.  By monitoring ticket prices 
on StubHub, and incorporating that information into their dynamic pricing algorithm, teams can 
adjust their ticket prices to better reflect real-time demand and supply.  Therefore, when the 
secondary market has tickets available for, say, $8 on a Wednesday night game in September, a 
team with hundreds or thousands of tickets available can compete by reducing its ticket prices 
and offering other benefits, like food coupons or vouchers for future game tickets.  As a result, 
the baseball team receives added income rather than the secondary-ticket vendor or the scalper. 
 
Dynamic Pricing and MLB 
 With the development of StubHub, fans gained access to a market for MLB tickets that 
used dynamic pricing.  But the benefits of the market went mostly to individuals who purchased 
tickets at low prices from the teams, then resold them at higher prices when conditions permitted.  
Consider a team that has an unexpectedly good season.  The team’s owners based ticket prices 
on an “average” season, but since the team started to perform above expectations, willingness to 
pay for tickets was above expectation.  Scalpers would purchase additional seats at the low fixed 
price posted by the team, and then sell them at higher prices as the team’s tickets became sold 
out.  The team would not receive the full value of the increased demand for its tickets, since the 
team would not raise the price of unsold seats (Happel and Jennings, 2002; Hansen and Gauthier, 
1989). 
 Switching to dynamic pricing allowed the teams to raise prices when demand increased 
unexpectedly, and lower prices when demand declined unexpectedly.  With the development of 
changing prices on the secondary market, fans became more familiar with dynamic pricing.  But 
for dynamic pricing to work, the team has to estimate changes in demand before sellers on the 
secondary market.  Otherwise, scalpers could purchase underpriced tickets before they were re-
priced, eliminating gains to the teams.  This requires the ability for the teams to first forecast 
demand changes, then re-price potentially hundreds of thousands of unsold tickets (Muret, 2010).  
Adoption of dynamic pricing required another decrease in the cost of measuring variation in 
value. 
 The implementation of this type of forecasting and re-pricing is similar to the topic of 
“Moneyball,” Michael Lewis’ popular book and movie on baseball analytics.  In this story, a 
student of the game overturned decades of ingrained thinking and persuaded a team (the Oakland 
Athletics) it could win by sophisticated data analysis.  In the dynamic pricing case, the person 
challenging the system was not a former baseball player, but instead a 26 year old baseball fan 
completing a Ph.D. in economics at the University of Texas.   
 In 2007, Barry Kahn founded Qcue Inc. to market his dynamic pricing model.  Kahn was 
able to persuade the San Francisco Giants to try dynamic pricing in about 2,000 of its worst 
bleacher seats for the 2009 season.  By the end of the season, San Francisco had a 20 percent 
attendance increase in its test seats and an extra $500,000 in ticket revenue.  The success of this 
experiment resulted in the Giants using dynamic pricing for all single-game tickets in 2010, and 
all seasons since that time, armed with  computer-program assistance of Qcue Inc., based in 
Austin, Texas.  By 2013, 20 MLB teams were practicing dynamic ticket pricing.  Qcue is the 
market leader, accounting for more than 95 percent of all dynamically priced baseball tickets.  
Digonex Technologies Inc. also offers dynamic ticket pricing services to MLB. 
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 Concerning the Giants, although dynamic pricing has led to higher ticket prices for some 
of its games, the Giants to date have not attempted to match prices on the secondary market.  For 
example, when the team was selling tickets to a Boston Red Sox game for $90 in August, 2013, 
similar locations for the same game were priced at $350 per ticket on StubHub.  Therefore, the 
Giants were attempting to increase ticket revenue by using dynamic pricing, but they were not 
trying to maximize ticket revenue.  In effect, the Giants were “leaving money on the table,” 
probably to avoid being accused of price gouging by unhappy fans.  Also, the Giants have used 
dynamic pricing to charge a lower price for tickets to less attractive games in an attempt to 
increase sales.  Not only has this been a good public relations policy for the team, but lowering 
ticket prices has increased attendance and ancillary revenue such as parking, concessions, and 
merchandise that would be limited if tickets are priced too high.  Since its adoption in 2009, 
dynamic ticket pricing has helped the Giants fill its AT&T Park with fans.  In 2013, for example, 
the team’s home-game attendance averaged 41,584, with 99.2 percent of the Park’s seats sold, 
the highest in MLB.  This strong performance occurred in spite of the Giants having a losing 
season (76 wins and 86 losses) and not making the playoffs.  
 So why did it take so long for dynamic pricing to penetrate the sports industry?  
According to  Barry Kahn, , accurately pricing tickets is very difficult.   In its initial stages, Qcue 
had both emotional and technical barriers to overcome.  The company was changing the way 
things had been done for so many years, moving from pricing tickets 9 months out and keeping 
them static, to allowing the price to change right up until the first pitch.  That required educating 
those in charge of ticketing operations and also the fans. Teams were hesitant to embrace this 
idea over fears of turning off fans; some viewed it as institutional price gouging without realizing 
that it’s a lesson in Economics 101.  Also, technical challenges were substantial.  It used to take 
3 days to make a price change within a ticketing system.  That’s 72 hours and countless steps to 
make a single change, let alone changing prices across every section of the stadium, across up to 
81 home games a year.  But with the advent of dynamic-pricing technologies, teams can now 
change thousands of prices with a single click (Rishe, 2012).   
 The sophisticated forecasting models of Qcue and Diogonex include dozens of variables 
that affect the demand for their clients’ tickets. Once a program has placed a value on such 
variables, which differ from team to team, the program projects the value of future games and 
gives recommendations on how prices should be determined for each seat in the stadium.  Thus, 
the forecasting model becomes a software overlay to a team's ticket system.  It remains up to a 
team’s management to decide whether or not to revise prices, and by how much.   Although most 
team managements meet about once a week throughout the season to make pricing decisions, 
more frequent price changes are possible.  For example, the management of the San Francisco 
Giants meets three to four times a week to revise prices.  The dynamic model of Qcue has the 
potential to allow price revisions every five minutes.    
 While dynamic pricing allows teams to change prices, teams still face constraints in how 
low prices may fall.  For example, if the price of a season ticket package is $20 per game, and 
the price of a single-game purchase is $25, the cost under dynamic pricing could increase above 
the $25 amount or decrease to $20, but never fall below $20. Otherwise, the season-ticket 
holders would likely switch to buying single game tickets. Thus, the season-ticket price places a 
floor under the dynamic price.  This is also consistent with the  benefits of overpricing, as 
described in section  four. 
 Consider the Seattle Mariners who currently use dynamic pricing for all of their single-
game tickets.  Subscribing to the services of Qcue, the Mariners’ pricing strategy takes into 
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account pitching matchups, injuries to key players, team performance, fireworks displays at 
particular games, the weather, day of the week, and so on.  These factors affect how much 
Mariners fans perceive the value of a game to be.  Ticket prices are based on how much, or how 
little, fans are willing to pay, right up to game-time.  Each day, the calculation changes as 
starting pitchers are announced, team records change, and tickets are sold, prompting the team to 
recalibrate prices. With Qcue's technology, thousands of price changes take just a few minutes.  
Table 1 provides examples of the Mariners’ prices for bleacher seats, seats behind first base, and 
seats behind home plate for games against the Boston Red Sox, Texas Rangers, Los Angeles-
Anaheim Angels, Kansas City Royals, Oakland Athletics, and Cleveland Indians as quoted on 
July 7, 2013 (subject to change as demand conditions change).  Notice the discrepancy in the 
prices of an identical category of seats, depending on the Mariners' opponent, day of week, and 
so on.  
 Of all of the professional sports, MLB provides the best opportunity for dynamic ticket 
pricing.  Compared to other sports such as professional basketball and hockey, baseball teams 
play twice as many games, their stadiums are twice as large, and the percentage of season ticket 
holders represents a smaller fraction of total sales.  Other factors include an exclusive playoff 
system where only a limited number of teams advance, and outdoor stadiums where weather 
often plays a role.   Has dynamic pricing been a success?  Qcue estimates that its clients have 
increased revenue by an average of about 30 percent in high demand situations and about 5-10 
percent in low demand situations (Rishe, 2012).   
 
Table 1: Dynamic Ticket Pricing and the Seattle Mariners, 2013 
Lower Deck,  Upper Deck,  Center 
    Behind First  Behind Home  Field 
    Base   Plate   Bleachers  
Boston Red Sox 
Monday, July 8  $72   $34   $19 
Thursday, July 11    73     35     24 
 
Los Angeles Angels 
Friday, July 12    61     29     18 
 
Cleveland Indians 
Monday, July 22    61     12     14 
 
Texas Rangers 
Tuesday, August 27    61     28     14 
 
Kansas City Royals 
Tuesday, September 24    46     19      6 
 
Oakland A’s 
Friday September 27    53     24      9 
 
 
Source: Seattle.Mariners.mlb.com 
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Conclusion 
 The use of dynamic ticket pricing by MLB teams is in its infancy, and thus, there remain 
many unanswered questions regarding its usefulness.  However, a number of teams have adopted 
this strategy and it appears that it will become increasingly popular in the years ahead not only in 
baseball, but in other sports.  By providing a primer on dynamic ticket pricing as applied to 
MLB, our paper hopefully makes a contribution to pricing topics that are currently taught in 
intermediate microeconomics and managerial economics courses. 
 MLB teams sell seats at games that are fundamentally non-homogenous.  Customers’ 
willingness to pay is influenced by such variables as seat location, game date, the opposing team, 
the win/loss record of each team, and the weather.  Setting homogenous prices nine months 
ahead of time leaves much of the customer’s variability in willingness to pay un-captured by the 
teams.  Historically these potential profits were retained by fans purchasing underpriced seats, or 
scalpers engaging in arbitrage, or competed away by excess standing in lines or expensive to 
operate “scalper” markets. 
 Variable pricing, in which teams selected different prices for seats at games with 
predictably higher or lower value, transferred some of these gains from fans and scalpers to the 
teams, and decreased transaction costs.  The switch to variable pricing followed the introduction 
of business information systems, which reduced the cost of measuring and pricing these margins 
of value. But other sources of variability in value could not be predicted nine months in advance.  
By switching to dynamic pricing, where the price of a seat varied over time based on changing 
demand conditions, teams have been able to capture more of the value of the services they 
provide.  This switch required decreases in the cost of measuring the variability in value, and 
decreases in the cost of re-pricing tickets to match this changing value.  The development of 
specialized forecasting software by firms such as Qcue created this decrease in measurement 
cost, and resulted in the introduction of dynamic pricing to MLB. 
 Traditional, static ticket pricing requires relatively long-range planning. It is grounded in 
knowing what fans consider value and organizing to anticipate how they might react to a team’s 
performance throughout a season.  Now, with dynamic ticket pricing, the planning has switched 
to the short term; the only real long-term consideration is which forecasting formula will be used 
in the season’s pricing strategy.  But even if teams did not have a sophisticated computer model 
for forecasting the demand for tickets, and they could not precisely measure all the factors that 
fans care about, they could still have a general idea about which games would sell better in 
advance.  Therefore, they could increase the price of unsold tickets to those games even if they 
didn’t know the optimal, profit-maximizing amount by which to change the price. The point is 
that the pricing of tickets does not have to be between no dynamic pricing and optimal dynamic 
pricing—there seems to be some middle ground that could increase team profits. 
 Although dynamic pricing strives to help teams recoup some of the ticket revenue that is 
lost due to the mispricing of tickets, challenges remain for this strategy.  A first concern is that 
dynamic pricing may give fans too many choices.  If fans are confronted with a broad array of 
confusing prices, they may decide to buy their tickets elsewhere or decide not to purchase tickets 
at all.  As psychologists have explained, choosing between a multitude of salad dressings tends 
to paralyze a person's decision making and leave that person dissatisfied.  Can the same be said 
for ticket sales, especially when they include daily (sometimes hourly) fluctuations in price?  
Also, what should a team do if a game is rained out?  To avoid the risk of offending fans, should 
a team provide fans with a ticket to another game even if the ticket to the subsequent game is 
priced higher than the ticket to the rained out game?  Charging an additional fee for a ticket to a 
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subsequent game might offend fans.  The general point is that dynamic pricing needs to keep 
things simple to avoid confusion.  It remains to be seen how dynamic ticket pricing will play out. 
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